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[W]hen sociological observers began to enter the places where scientific 
knowledge is produced, the laboratory, they found many practices that seemed 
to share more with daily life outside the lab than with the strict edicts governing 
knowledge in science, such as universality, objectivity, or reproducibility. 
Measurement ... might be based on a very unclear ... consensus. Techniques 
might be developed in local settings and depend on local materials and 
practices. . . . The establishment of findings in the laboratory as facts accepted 
by the wider scientific community might tum out to be in large part a social 
process ... of gaining credibility .... 1 
An idealized description of scientific activity persists in law and in 
legal literature. From the Daubert four-part test, formulated in 1993-
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2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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science is (i) testable, (ii) with a low error rate, (iii) usually published, 
and (iv) generally accepted3 -to the new Federal Rule of Evidence 
702-scientific testimony is based on sufficient data and is the product 
of reliable methods4-the social embeddedness of science is virtually 
ignored in favor of a "core" or "bottom-line" summary description. 
Even when decidedly social aspects of the scientific enterprise-for 
example, funding bias, fraud, and governing research paradigms-are 
acknowledged, they are seemingly viewed as fleeting and irrelevant to 
the project of defining "science."5 There is little attention paid to the 
inevitable, not anomalous, institutional and rhetorical features of modem 
science. The purpose of this Article is to explore that deficiency, explain 
how some science studies scholars investigate social embeddedness, and 
suggest how judges and attorneys might view science differently in light 
of such studies. 
The distinction between inevitable and anomalous social features of 
science is not always clear. For example, language itself is necessary to 
science, but the particular, dominant style of "agentless prose"6 among 
scientists is arguably subject to critique and transformation. While rhetoric 
and persuasion are inevitable features in the production of scientific 
knowledge, a particular scientific community's research standard for 
required precision may, following criticism, change.7 Complicating the 
distinction, some features of science, like a particular community's 
research standard in my last example, might be viewed by scientists as 
subject to change but not anomalous. That is, the precision requirement 
is viewed as good for science. Thus the institutionalization and 
professionalization of modem science, to the extent that its particular 
3. Id. at 593-94. 
4. FED. R. Evm. 702. 
5. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A 
Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1563 (2000). Beecher-Monas begins 
her "primer" with a strong acknowledgment of science as culture-bound, id. at 1576, but 
then the elements of her "heuristic" are reduced to hypothesis, data, inferences, 
methodology, and probable conclusion, id. at 1589-90. 
6. See David Locke, Voices of Science, 67 AM. SCHOLAR 103, 104 (1998) ("That 
official language of science-policed by the referees and editorial boards of scientific 
publications-is what English teachers call agentless prose; that is, there is no designated 
agent for any of the actions it describes."); see also TERRY THREADGOLD, FEMINIST 
POETICS: POIESIS, PERFORMANCE, HISTORIES 16-34 (1997). Threadgold traces in the 
history of science 
the gradual disappearance of the embodied masculine subject of science from 
the scene of his scientific activities .... 
The generic organisation of the scientific article and the business of 
citation now functions, disembodied and desexed ... [to hide] a profoundly 
embodied and disciplined process, subject to all kinds of policy, institutional, 
private and power relationships .... 
Id. at 21-22. 
7. See infra notes 30, 38. 
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"Authority Structure" and "Reward System'' is not inevitable, is 
arguably necessary for science to flourish.8 Nevertheless, a distinction 
should be made between inevitable social features-cognitive limitations, 
communal standards and conventions, shared language, and 
institutionalization-and those that are not integral to science-fraud,9 the 
public's ideology,10 the effect of business interests,11 political influence,12 
ethical limitations,13 or a combination of the foregoing. 14 The latter 
anomalous or eliminable features of science, or ''junk" science, are 
clearly acknowledged and are part of legal discourse. In my emphasis 
on the inevitable features of science, I am neither claiming generally that 
they are good for science, because they make good science possible, nor 
that they challenge the status of science because scientific knowledge is 
merely a narrative or a social construction. Rather, I think an 
8. See David Goodstein & James Woodward, Inside Science, 68 AM. SCHOLAR 83 
(1999). "[T]he basic outlines of the social organization of science emerged almost as 
soon as science did . . . . It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that science cannot exist-
certainly cannot flourish-without the Reward System and the Authority Structure." Id. 
at 90. The "Reward System" is collectively "[t]he various means by which scientists 
express admiration and esteem for their colleagues," which system is guided and 
controlled by the Authority Structure; "[t]he goals of those in the Authority Structure are 
power and influence." Id. at 84. 
9. See Daniel S. Greenberg, Turning Science Into Gold, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 
1999, at A29 (discussing a "review of a series of drug tests [that] concluded that 
favorable results were puffed up through repetition in various publications, while 
negative information was played down or ignored"). 
10. See John McCarron, Science Takes a Back Seat to Ideology, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 
24, 2000, § l, at 13 (criticizing "democratized science;" public hearing on vaccination 
endorsed by American Academy of Pediatrics allows suspicious citizens to overturn 
scientific experts). 
11. See Eric Pianin, Dioxin Report by EPA on Hold: Industries Oppose Finding of 
Cancer Link, Urge Delay, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2001, at Al (chemical, beef, and 
poultry industries challenge EPA study as "not based on science"); see also Michael 
Stem, Raiders of the Lost Genome, AM. LAWYER, Feb. 2001, at 77 ("[T]he market 
economy . . . always makes the question of who owns what more important than who 
knows what.") (reviewing KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME (2000) ). 
12. See Pianin, supra note 11, at Al (''The Bush Administration has challenged 
several Clinton-era environmental and public health rules and initiatives-including a 
tough new standard for arsenic in drinking water--on the grounds they weren't 
scientifically sound and would cause economic hardship to industry and local 
governments."). 
13. See Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts Stem Cell Meeting, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 21, 2001, at A2 (discussing ethical and theological concerns over stem cell 
research). 
14. See Barron Lerner, Body Politics: How Public Pressure, Private Interests and 
Powerful Lobbies Infect the Treatment of Breast Cancer, WASH. POST, HEALTH MAG., 
May 22, 2001, at 14. 
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acknowledgment of and discourse concerning the inevitable social 
features of science would lead to a more accurate conception of how 
science works and, in particular cases, could lead to novel lines of critical 
inquiry on the part of lawyers, judges, and juries concerning some 
scientific controversies, some scientific theories, and some scientists. In 
short, the inevitable social aspects of science are neither good nor bad in 
general, but understanding their role in the production of scientific 
knowledge provides another potential basis to challenge or defend expert 
scientific testimony in certain cases. Just as a large payment to an expert 
to testify is not necessarily indicative of bias, but might signal either bias 
or credibility (for example, success, reputation, and authority) in particular 
cases, evidence concerning cognitive limitations, standards as to what is 
worth investigating, governing metaphors, dominant theoretical models, 
and institutional gatekeeping within science might signal innocent bias or, 
conversely, frameworks establishing credibility, in particular cases. 
In Part I, I confirm the idealizations of science in law and their 
implications for legal scholarship and practice. In Part II, I describe the 
ethnographic method used by science studies scholars, with reference to 
my own ethnographic analysis of interviews with three neuroscientists. I 
conclude Part II by identifying various social aspects of science that 
comprise a complex picture of scientific activity. In Part ill, I discuss 
the implications of ethnomethodology for trial practice, including 
deposition analysis, Daubert-type hearings, cross-examination techniques, 
and drafting jury instructions. Part IV addresses anticipated criticisms of 
my arguments. 
I. IDEALIZING SCIENCE 
"Scientists such as Wolpert happily acknowledge that science 
is a social activity. Every practicing scientist is acutely aware of 
it. How could one not be? All he wishes to deny is that 'science 
is merely a social construct with little special validity. '"15 
Everybody, it seems, is willing to acknowledge the social character of 
scientific activity. 16 The real issue is whether the social features of 
15. David L. Hull, The Professionalization of Science Studies: Cutting Some Slack, 
15 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 61, 85 (2000) (citation omitted) (quoting Lewis Wolpert, Response 
to Fuller, 24 Soc. STUD. SCI. 745, 745 (1994)). 
16. See Philip Kitcher, A Plea for Science Studies, in A HOUSE BUILT ON SAND: 
EXPOSING POSTMODERNIST MYTHS ABOUT SCIENCE 36 (Noretta Koertge ed., 1998). 
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Although some idealized treatments of science proceed as if inquiry were 
carried out by subjects who were disembodied, logically omniscient, and 
alone, everybody knows better. . . . Those who want to slight the ... thesis 
[that science is done by cognitively limited beings in social groups with 
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science make a significant difference in terms of scientific reliability and 
success. 17 While there may be a perceived risk in the fields of the 
history, philosophy, and sociology of science (i) that attention to the 
socio-historical aspects of science might eclipse our notions of scientific 
progress, predictive success, canons of reason and evidence, and the 
existence of theory-independent entities, 18 or (ii) that emphasizing power 
relations, boundary work, 19 institutional arrangements, and governing 
discourse might render scientists' own internal accounts ( of their work 
as pragmatic, approximate, evidence-relational, and model-based) 
superfluous,20 I do not believe there is any such danger in law. Given the 
reliance on science by legal institutions, the risk is instead that realist or 
rationalist and internal scientific perspectives will dominate legal 
discourse. 
Examples of idealizations of science include the Daubert four-part 
test,21 the 2000 amendment commentary to Federal Rule of Evidence 
702,22 and much of the recent scholarship on law and science to the 
Id. 
complicated structures and long histories] surely do not contest these points 
but, rather, deny that they have any impact on the practice of science .... 
[However,] individual and group histories and/or social roles make a 
difference to scientific work. 
17. Id. 
18. See id. at 34-38. Critics of science studies "are broadly right to recognize a 
persistent danger of overemphasizing the [socio-historical features of science] and 
ignoring [its realist-rationalist features]." Id. at 38. 
19. See Michael M. J. Fischer, Eye(l)ing the Sciences and Their Signijiers 
(Language, Tropes, Autobiographers): InterViewing for a Cultural Studies of Science 
and Technology, in TECHNOSCIENTIFIC IMAGINARIES: CONVERSATIONS, PROFILES, AND 
MEMOIRS 43, 60 (George E. Marcus ed., 1995) [hereinafter TECHNOSCIENTIFIC 
IMAGINARIES] (describing "the ways in which scientific knowledge polices its own 
boundaries against new ideas or new information that it cannot easily incorporate"); see 
also Charles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science and the Troubles of 
Translation: Defining the Proper Role for Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74 NEB. L. 
REV. 529, 548-50 (1995). Scientists "use boundary work to self-define their community 
and maintain consensus among the members of that community." Id. at 548. 
20. See Fischer, supra note 19, at 59-64 (noting temptation to ignore accounts of 
science by scientists themselves in favor of a social constructivist, political mediationist, 
or narrative-theoretical account; each account is valid to a point but "dangerous if 
allowed to silence the other perspectives") (citing DONNA HARAWAY, PRIMATE VISIONS: 
GENDER, RACE, AND NATURE IN THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989)). 
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) 
(stating scientific knowledge is testable, with a low error rate, and is usually peer-
reviewed and generally accepted). 
22. See AMENDMENTS TO FED. R. Evm., H.R. Doc. No. 106-225, at 41 (2000) 
(stating that scientific knowledge is admissible by expert testimony "if (1) the testimony 
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extent that authors emphasize core aspects of science as the most 
significant for admissibility assessments.23 Core features of science 
include (i) the scientific hypothesis or theory ( or "testable theory"), (ii) 
scientific data, (iii) reliable testing or methodology, including standards 
and controls to ensure a low error rate, and (iv) a conclusion, or probable 
conclusion, with explanatory power. Each of these features of science 
has an obvious anchor in nature or reality-(i) theories are formulated 
with reference to perceived reality, (ii) the data is a representation of 
natural phenomena, (iii) the methodology is how the data is handled, and 
(iv) the probable conclusion should lead to explanatory power and 
success. However, each of the core features of science also has an 
anchor in social structures-(i) theories reflect personal and communal 
beliefs and values as to what is important or worth studying,24 which 
beliefs and values have a histo~ and refer back to earlier research, 
institutional training, and professionalization of scientists;26 (ii) 
observation of data is mediated by cognitive capacity and theoretical 
presuppositions (hence the term "theory-laden observation," which 
suggests the researcher is looking for some things but not for others);27 
(iii) methodology also has a social histo~ of experimental conventions, 
and may vary among fields of research;2 measurement technology and 
inscription devices also have a social history related to available 
resources and theoretical paradigms;29 and (iv) even conclusions are 
made with reference to acceptabilicy standards, arising from the history 
of research and practical demands. 30 Such social aspects are not, or 
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case"). 
23. See, e.g., Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 1576, 1589-90; see also David S. 
Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Expertise 
and lnterdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 685, 741-43 (2000) 
(discussing a variety of approaches). 
24. See David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 67, 70 (2d ed. 2000). "At the most fundamental level, it is 
impossible to observe nature without having some reason to choose what is worth 
observing and what is not worth observing." Id. 
25. See Kitcher, supra note 16, at 36. 
26. See Goodstein, supra note 24, at 75-77. 
27. See id. at 70 (''Popper believed all science begins with a prejudice, or perhaps 
more politely, a theory or hypothesis."). 
28. See id. (''We don't really know what the scientific method is."); see also Gary 
Edmond, Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence, 63 MOD. L. REV. 216, 220 
(2000) ("There is no universal scientific method determining every aspect of scientific 
practice."). 
29. See MARTIN, supra note 1, at 6. 
30. See Kitcher, supra note 16, at 37 ("[T]he practical demands and the history of 
research standards also help determine what will count as acceptable solutions, specifying, 
for example, the precision that an answer must achieve if it is to be applicable."). 
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should not be, particularly controversial, but they are often not identified 
and discussed as significant in idealized accounts of science. When the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in Daubert, defined science as involving testable 
theories, a low error rate, peer review and publication, and general 
acceptance,31 those elements became topics of discussion in legal 
scholarship, bar journals, and continuing legal education. Lawyers and 
judges, quite naturally, focused their attention on these aspects of 
science in matters of admissibility of expert testimony. 
Significantly, the last two features of the Daubert four-part test-peer 
review and publication, and general acceptance32-identify social 
aspects of scientific activity. They are not, however, on the same level 
as testability and low error rate, which are considered to be the markers 
of valid science.33 Most of the time, Justice Blackmun opined, valid 
theories will be the product of the peer review and publication process, 
and will attain general acceptance-those that are not published or 
generally accepted should be viewed with suspicion.34 Social aspects of 
science are thereby downplayed, and the opportunity is missed for a 
critical discourse concerning the institutional and rhetorical characteristics of 
peer review and publication, and general acceptance. 
The idealized or core account of science is illustrated in Diagram I. 
Again, this picture of science, in law, leads judges and lawyers, and 
therefore juries, to focus on adequacy of data or testing, presence of 
publications, and level of general acceptance in (i) judicial assessments 
of reliability, (ii) determining appropriate subjects for deposition and 
cross-examination questions, and (iii) drafting jury instructions. 
Once acknowledged, the social aspects of scientific activity may 
nevertheless be characterized, in idealized accounts of science, as 
relatively insignificant or at least as unworthy of serious attention. First, 
one may distinguish between internal and external factors in scientific 
activity. Further, one may identify the internal factors as good, that is, 
productive and positive, and the external factors as bad, or at least as 
superfluous to genuine science.35 Indeed, peer review and publication, and 
31. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). 
32. Id. 
33. Testability and low error rate are identified, without qualification, as features 
of science, while peer review and publications, and general acceptance, are factors that 
may not always be present. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. See SANDRA HARDING, Is SCIENCE MULTICULTURAL?: POSTCOLONIALISMS, 
FEMINISMS, AND EPISTEMOLOGIES 2-3 (1998). 
275 
DIAGRAM I 
Peer Review Application 
and use: 
Scientist (''S") s s s Consumption 
~ t t v of Science and has Theory, Its Successes Collects Data, H> Tests Theory 
I I [Low Error PUBLICATION I\ Rate], Draws '7 ~ ~ OR Conclusion 
s s s 
Criticism or 
General Acceptance Revision Based 
on Failures and 
Mistakes 
general acceptance may be seen as internal to good science; other 
internal factors might include institutional gatekeeping (including 
training and professionalization), methodological preferences, experimental 
conventions, instruments and measurement technologies, models to 
represent nature, theoretical paradigms, scientific language, negotiation 
techniques and strategies for conflict resolution and consensus-building, 
cognitive capacity and perception, and even values like consistency, 
honesty, rigor, self-criticism, and reproducibility. Each such factor is a 
social, not natural, structure, but each may be conceived as conducive to 
natural scientific inquiry. 
Id. 
276 
A central assumption of [the conventional] theory of scientific knowledge is 
that the success of modem science is insured by its internal features-
experimental method or scientific method more generally, science's standards 
for maximizing objectivity and rationality, the use of mathematics to express 
nature's laws .... 
Therefore, when sciences function at their very best, their institutions, 
cultures, and practices ... should be understood to provide the necessary 
conditions for sciences to do their work, but they should not influence the 
results of research in any culturally distinctive way. Any and all social values 
and interests that might initially get into the results of scientific research 
should be firmly weeded out as soon as possible through subsequent critical 
vigilance. 
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External factors might include political interests and pressures, 
including ethical and policy limitations, economic interests, funding 
bias, fraud, bad or misleading instruments and models, greed, ambition, 
rhetoric and persuasion, gender or racial bias, and general cultural 
values. The problem with internal and external distinctions is that 
external factors are not always bad or superfluous, and internal factors 
are not always good or productive. Greed, ambition, persuasion, or 
economic interests might produce the best science, while institutional 
gatekeeping, theoretical paradigms, and models may at times lead 
scientists astray. 
Even if the internal and external distinction breaks down, social 
factors may also be ignored through a distinction between context of 
discovery and context of justification.36 The messier aspects of science, 
for example greed or ambition, may be categorized as belonging to the 
context of discovery, where new ideas might come from anywhere,37 
even from sloppy techniques and cultural bias. The validity of science is 
grounded in the context of justification, which is the idealized picture of 
science: testability, methodology, reproducibility and probable conclusions. 
This distinction, as well, is problematic, since social aspects pervade the 
context of justification. 38 
36. See Fischer, supra note 19, at 63-64. "Scientists distinguish between 
discovery (which may be serendipitous) and confirmation/falsification, between the 
sociology of science and the content of science . . . . [Such] accounts ... ignore or 
downplay the sociological and political environments that enable them." Id. 
37. See Goodstein, supra note 24, at 70 ("Nobody can say where the theory comes 
from."); see also Ian Hacking, How Inevitable Are the Results of Successful Science?, 67 
PHIL. Ser. S58, S69 (2000). 
[I]t is patently obvious that which questions get asked, taken seriously, 
investigated, funded, reported, analyzed, and so forth is the result of social 
processes, human interactions, and current interests. Very few detailed 
questions are asked about the most widespread tropical diseases because there 
is no money in it for drug companies .... 
HACKING, supra, at 569. 
38. See WERNER CALLEBAUT, TAKING THE NATURALISTIC TuRN, OR How REAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IS DONE 211-13 (1993) (transcribing conversations with 
William Bechtel, Thomas Nickles, and other philosophers of science). 
Bechtel: Examining the work of scientists ... I came to realize what proportion 
of their time was devoted to social activities and how important those were 
in terms of determining the intellectual content of their work. Such things 
as which scientist would respond to which other and what experiment 
someone would do were affected .... 
Even [conforming to a prescribed style in a scientific text] is an important 
social constraint: you realize that scientists are writing in a particular way 
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Finally, another "defense mechanism" to critical discussion of social 
factors is the explanation of errors by reference to social influences, and 
the explanation of success by reference to nature.39 For example, 
funding bias and political pressure may be viewed as mistakes to 
eliminate, leaving the impression that social influences can be avoided. 
All of these characterizations of the social aspects of science-external 
influences, internal supports, context of discovery, and avoidable 
errors-function to downplay the inevitable institutional and rhetorical 
character of scientific theory and practice. 
Because the narrative above identifies at least twenty social aspects of 
science in addition to the peer-reviewed publication process, another 
diagram may be helpful to show how our picture of science can be 
expanded beyond the previous core or idealized picture. Diagram II is 
also a representation of how most of these social factors can be 
explained away or rendered superfluous. The "external influences" 
depicted above the idealized account of science include the "context of 
discovery" (where greed or ambition, or anything-for example, 
because that's the only style that's acceptable to get their ideas across. 
They're fitting into a channel.... Also, I came to realize that there is a 
dynamic that involves who else is in the community and that this influences 
how one scientist uses words to establish something. 
Callebaut: Back to justification. You [Nickles] make a daring claim ... that in 
a sense all justification-and hence all rationality-is at bottom social. 
Nickles: It sounds daring, but in a way it's trivial. At bottom what else is 
there? Justification comes down to addressing human critics . . . . [I]t is 
ultimately a matter of what the critical community lets you get away with. 
The important philosophical implication is that justification as it really 
operates in ongoing inquiry is quite local. The arguments and moves that 
make a difference, that cause investigators to behave one way rather than 
another, are typically quite local. 
Id.; see also STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 10 (1996) ("There is as much 
'society' inside the scientist's laboratory, and internal to the development of scientific 
knowledge, as there is 'outside."'). 
39. See JONATIIAN POITER, REPRESENTING REALITY: DISCOURSE, RHETORIC AND 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION I 9 (1996). 
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False belief could be directly explained through a "social fact" (personality, 
prejudice and so on) disrupting the proper operation of scientific norms. True 
belief ... arises directly from a careful investigation of how the world is. Put 
simply, in this view of science, the facts themselves determine truth, while 
error is explained by processes of a psychological or sociological nature. The 
consequence of this is that with true belief there was nothing to explain save 
for how the conditions for proper scientific inquiry came about and how those 
conditions are undermined. 
In effect ... the [sociology of error] tradition ... bracketed off the study 
of facts themselves and contented itself with examining their sociological 
context. A full sociological analysis of the content of science-of scientific 
ideas, theories, methods and so on-was reserved only for falsehoods. 
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religion-might accidentally lead to good, justifiable science). Other 
examples of external influences include cultural or social influences, as 
well as erroneous or junk science. All of these influences may be 
viewed as eliminable, once identified, by setting a boundary between 
them and the core activities. Indeed, the core, expressed earlier as the 
idealized picture of science, becomes the "context of justification," the 
arena wherein fraud can be caught, mistakes can be corrected, and 
biased or interested science can be falsified. The "internal supports"-
the social aspects of science depicted below the core activities on the 
diagram-are harder to get rid of, but may be dismissed as obvious (that 
is, language and perception are givens) and in any event as necessary but 
benign and unproblematic. If something does go wrong internally, such 
as an insufficient model, a biased laboratory or an inaccurate 
measurement device, then it becomes an external influence to be moved 
to the top of the diagram and then eliminated by careful core activities. 
In the remainder of this Article, I want to challenge the "dismissive" 
arrangement of influences in Diagram II by suggesting that many of 
these identifiable social aspects of science should remain in play in our 
legal discourse concerning scientific expertise. This is not to say that 
every social aspect identified is present or significant in every scientific 
activity, but rather that many social factors are characteristic of science 
generally, and therefore are as much a part of science as data or an 
experimental test. After discussing how sociologists of science identify 
and investigate the significance of the social aspects of science, I suggest 
how lawyers and judges might do the same. 
II. ETHNOGRAPHY AND SCIENCE 
[T]he fact that science is political and deeply embedded in [cultural] events 
is not simply the now-cliched, albeit important conclusion of social scientists 
and historians studying scientists, but is part of the condition of doing 
science . . . . Some scientists ... acknowledge their social embeddedness not at 
all or only in the most indirect and subtle ways; for others it is diversely and 
strongly expressed.40 
Ethnomethodology41 has become an established, if varied, mode of 
40. George E. Marcus, Introduction, in TECHNOSCIENTIAC IMAGINARIES, supra 
note 19, at 1, 7. 
41. See MICHAEL MOERMAN, TALKING CULTURE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND 
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS ix (1988) ("The term 'ethnometholodogy' ... is the proper 
name for viewing 'the objective reality of social facts as an ongoing accomplishment of 
the concerted activities of daily life,"' and for "discovering the formal properties of 
common-place ... actions 'from within' actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of 
those settings." (quoting HAROLD GARANKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY vii-viii 
(1967))). Moerman distinguishes "conversation analysis"-the study of "the 
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analysis in science studies. In anthropology, "ethnography usually 
requires learning the language, developing key informants, and spending 
at least one to two years of more-or-less continuous participant-
observation in a community, organization, or social movement."42 The 
method has been borrowed in other disciplines such as ethnomusicology 
(wherein the local music of an ethnic community is studied), and in 
comparative law, for example by Leopold Pospisil in The Ethnology of 
Law,43 which focused on the legal system of the Kapauku Papuans of 
West New Guinea. In science studies, however, 
"ethnography" has historically applied loosely to any kind of fieldwork-based 
method, including short-term observational studies. Thus, in science studies 
circles the term has a considerably looser usage than in anthropology. . . . For 
this reason, the term "laboratory studies" is preferable for the first wave of 
ethnographic studies [which] addressed questions about theoretical issues in the 
sociology and philosophy ofknowledge.44 
Following scientists through society, or looking over their shoulders, 
is a means to study the fact-making process, to view the "interactions 
among scientific, governmental, industrial, religious, and other domains 
of society," and to identify rituals, values, and material culture such as 
buildings, machines, and equipment that characterize the scientific 
enterprise.45 The anthropological model is justified by viewing science 
as a subculture with its own language(s), conventions, institutional 
hierarchies, values, and structures for training and professionalization of 
its members. 46 
organization of everyday talk''-from ethnography -"understanding ... how people 
make sense of their lives," but says that conversation analysis is within the intellectual 
tradition of ethnomethodology and must be coupled with ethnography. Id. at x. 
42. DAVID J. HEss, SCIENCE STIJDIES: AN ADVANCED INTRODUCTION 134 (1997). 
43. LEOPOLD J. POSPISIL, THE ETHNOLOGY OF LAW (2d ed. 1978). 
44. HEss, supra note 42, at 134. 
45. See id. at 135. 
46. See BRUNO LATOUR, WEHAVENEVERBEENMODERN 101-02 (1993). 
[The ethnologist] sets out to analyze one tribe . . . for example, scientific 
researchers or engineers . . . . Her tribe of scientists claims that in the end they 
are completely separating their knowledge of the world from the necessities of 
politics and morality. In the observer's eyes, however, this separation is never 
very visible . . . . Her informers claim that they have access to Nature, but the 
ethnographer sees perfectly well that they have access only to a vision, a 
representation of Nature that she herself cannot distinguish neatly from politics 
and social interests. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Reasons for engaging in ethnographic research, which usually 
involves interviewing scientists as "informants" and analyzing the 
transcripts, vary in science studies.47 Some want to discern the values at 
work in science, particularly to reveal unattractive values or to suggest 
social values to which scientists should be committed.48 Others want to 
degrade scientific knowledge, to demonstrate that science is just another 
cultural activity with no more claim to truth than political theory or 
religion.49 My own sense is that ethnographic research is useful in the 
effort to define science or describe how it really works.50 Whatever the 
purpose, the ethnography of science is a growing subdiscipline of 
science studies that is no longer haphazard or undertheorized. Examples 
of ethnographic research are published,51 and materials are available that 
identify interviewing skills and common blunders,52 as well as the 
importance of indexicality ("the meaning of a word or utterance is 
dependent on its context of use"), reflexivity ("descriptions are not just 
about something but they are also doing something"), and the 
documentary method of interpretation (people understand "events and 
actions ... in terms of background expectancies, models, and ideas") in 
conversation analysis.53 Because of my concern that idealized accounts 
47. See generally Marcus, supra note 40, and the ethnographic conversations and 
commentaries collected in TECHNOSCIENTIFIC IMAGINARIES, supra note 19. 
48. See, e.g., Langdon Winner, Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and 
Finding It Empty, 16 SCI. AS CULTURE 427, 443-49 (1993) (arguing that social studies of 
science and technology should not be neutral reports but morally and politically 
evaluative). 
49. Jonathan Potter, for example, describes the social constructivist "argument ... 
that there is nothing epistemologically special about scientific work. Scientific 
knowledge production does not have principled differences from knowledge in legal or 
everyday settings." POTIER, supra note 39, at 35. Ethnomethodology or conversation 
analysis offers critics of science a tool for studying "the methods people use for 
producing and understanding factual descriptions." Id. at 42. 
50. See Marcus, supra note 40, at 7. 
[B]eginning to ask how scientists have faith in their own activity, or in what 
ways their perceptions of what they are doing are changing, given some form 
of distinctive consciousness about the social and cultural construction of their 
activity, generates a completely transformed and vast field of inquiry on which 
a distinctly cultural studies of science might establish itself. The reflexivity 
brings a range of new factors explicitly into the production of science, and in 
this sense, makes it more directly cultural, or blended with concerns that were 
thought to be external to scientific activity. 
51. See sources cited supra note 47. 
52. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BRIGGS, LEARNING How TO ASK: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC 
APPRAISAL OF THE ROLE OF THE INTERVIEW IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (1986). 
53. See POTIER, supra note 39, at 43, 47, 49. A useful example of indexicality and 
problems of interpretation appears in Michael Moerman & Harvey Sacks, On 
"Understanding" in the Analysis of Natural Conversation, in MOERMAN, supra note 41, 
at app. B. 
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Roger says: "Ken face it, you're a poor little rich kid." Ken then says: "Yes, 
Mommy. Thank you." Roger then says: "Face the music." We are sure that 
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of science in law tend toward "stereotypical images of scientists as cut 
off from society and culture, concerned only with the micro-worlds of 
labs and their professional networks,"54 and because of the suggestion in 
science studies that "the insight concerning the social constructedness 
and embeddedness of scientific activity ... is also shared to varying degrees 
by scientists and scientific institutions themselves,"55 I decided to 
interview three neuroscientists concerning their laboratory research. My 
goal was to explore, in conversation, aspects of scientific activity that 
are not captured in idealizations of science. I chose neuroscientists as 
informants both because their field is dynamic and revolutionary within 
the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology56 and because neuroscientists 
often collapse social existence into the natural, hence the term "eliminative 
materialism."57 My informants included "X," a very successful middle-
aged professor, who is a recipient of numerous grants, is engaged in 
commercial consulting, and is the author of numerous publications and 
you, like those present, [understood] ..• Ken's "Mommy" as a deliberate and 
consequential misidentification of Roger, and not as an error, or as a correct 
identification of someone not present-Ken's mother. 
MOERMAN, supra note 41, at 185. 
54. See Marcus, supra note 40, at 7. 
55. See id. 
56. See Joseph Durnil, Twenty-First-Century PET: Looking for Mind and Morality 
Through the Eye of Technology, in TECHNOSCIENTIF1C IMAGINARIES, supra note 19, at 87 
(ethnographic analysis of scientists working in PET (positron emission tomography)). 
Dur.UT: Nancy Andreasen, she has written about the biological revolution 
in psychiatry. You were in medical school during this time. Did you also get 
the other side of psychiatry? 
[JOSEPH] Wu: Oh, very much so. I would say that most of the 
psychiatrists in this [U.C.-Irvine] department are still analytically, dynamically 
focused. I would say that biologically oriented psychiatrists still make up a 
minority of the faculty, maybe thirty to forty percent. 
Id. at 114-16. 
Id. 
51. See id. at 112-13. 
DUMIT: This [Washington University] is one of the centers of biological 
psychology. 
[MICHEL] TER-POGOSSIAN: Yes, indeed, there are few followers of 
Freud . . . . But I don't know what the human mind is. Don't misunderstand 
me, I'm not being difficult about that. But it is probably related to the brain. If 
you remove the brain, there is not much mind left. 
Dur.m: Right. I haven't met anybody involved with PET who is not at 
least that, the eliminative materialist, as it's called. 
TER-POGOSSIAN: Is that what it is? 
DUMIT: Without the brain, you are nothing. At least that much is 
material. 
TER-POGOSSIAN: Beyond that, it really starts getting difficult. 
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conference papers; "Y," a retiring professor at the end of a successful 
career; and "Z," a relatively young but highly credentialed professor. 
Even though I asked similar questions of each informant concerning 
educational background, current research, whether science is ever 
neutral, and new ideas in psychology, the particular socio-cultural 
aspects of science discussed by each varied somewhat. I should 
emphasize that my informants did not believe that they were engaged 
professionally in an enterprise that is primarily rhetorical, philosophical, 
or driven by social structures. Obviously, they saw their work as 
grounded in natural phenomena. Each therefore reacted against, in 
different ways, any suggestion that science is only a cultural discourse or 
belief system. Informant X was not enamored with the idea that the 
objects of science are quasi-objects or socio-natural hybrids, and he was 
dismissive of philosophy of science in general.58 Informants Y and Z 
viewed the social aspects of science as influences, which can be bad if 
research is restricted but good if they constitute useful structures in 
which scientists can work.59 
58. See Interview with X, Professor of Psychology, Neuroscience Program 7-8 
(Mar. 7, 2001) (unpublished transcript on file with author). 
Id. 
[CAUDILL]: [A] lot of ethnographic scholars in science studies are saying that 
what they're finding is a breakdown in any sort of Cartesian separation 
between subject and object. ... Also, your comments about every time you're 
dealing with an object in the lab, the brain activity regarding smell, that's not 
different from a person deciding to sit in a different place in the bus [in which 
an odor was placed in one seat]; ... was that a social activity, not sitting [in a 
particular seat] on the bus, or was that a natural object ... in the brain? The 
answer is it's both and neither, it is a quasi-object, it's something between the 
two .... 
[X]: I just cannot believe that.... I find that I'm reminded, my old advisor 
who said that he really liked philosophy until he reached adolescence and then 
he went on to other pursuits. I can't believe that is a viable argument and it 
seems to me specious. . . . What other world is there besides the natural 
world? 
59. See Interview with Y, Professor of Psychology, Neuroscience Program 15-16 
(Mar. 20, 2001) (unpublished transcript on file with author). 
[CAUDILL]: [S]ome scholars say that science is never neutral, it's not an 
activity that takes place in isolation, but there's always particular institutional 
settings, that there's always value choices as to what's important, there's 
always commitments as to what you're looking for because your discipline has 
a history and it's pulling for certain things .... 
[Y]: You know it seems like to a certain extent you almost have to have that 
kind of structure . . . . But the problem is of course if you have too much 
structure you really scare people off or else you really kind of prevent them 
developing the potential that they have. 
Id.; see also Interview with Z, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Neuroscience Program 
12-14 (Mar. 30, 2001) (unpublished transcript on file with author). 
[CAUDILL]: [S]cience studies scholars suggest that science is never neutral, it 
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Nevertheless, in our conversations it was clear that the social aspects 
of scientific activity are integral to the enterprise. Because I was 
interested in identifying social aspects of science, I began with a 
catalogue-a list or menu derived from scholarly literature in science 
studies-of potential social "factors." In my interviews, I chose not to 
inquire about those social factors which most scientists consider 
anomalous or eliminable, including greed, ambition, fraud, obvious 
funding bias or corporate agendas, bad measuring instruments, and 
mistakes or identifiable human error. I also did not focus on cultural 
variations in scientific research, or public understanding of and influence 
upon science, each of which has been the subject of critical studies of 
science.6° Finally, I wanted to distinguish between aspects of science 
that are, for all practical purposes, inevitable, and those that can be 
conceived of as problematic or controversial, such as the cultural 
construction of science in terms of class, race and ethnicity, or gender and 
sexuality.61 Focusing on the former, I was left with the following catalogue: 
always involves particular institutional settings with their own language and 
standards of persuasion, it's always got value choices as to what's 
important .... 
[Z]: Well, I think it's a double-edged sword .... [Y]es, science is not neutral .... 
[T]here's nobody handing out lots of money to just let us go free in the 
laboratory. . . . I know that that was practically the environment ... in the late 
60's to the early 70's .... I think that was extremely good for science. And I 
think it was bad because it created this public perception . . . . [W]hy was the 
taxpayer paying for that? ... 
On the other hand, I think that it really causes scientists to think long and hard 
about what it is they plan to do. 
60. Regarding cultural variations, see SHARON TRAWEEK, BEAMTIMES AND LIFETIMFS: 
THE WORLD OF HIGH ENERGY PHYSICISIS 126-64 (1988) ( comparing Japanese and Western 
physicists, and exploring the roles of national and gender cultures in shaping scientific 
institutions and practices); see also HEss, supra note 42, at 134-35. "Sharon Traweek's 
ethnographic studies of physicists, based on over a decade of ethnographic fieldwork, are 
often regarded as a landmark for the beginning of the second wave of ethnography [(the 
first wave was produced by Europeans trained in sociology and philosophy))." Id. at 
135. Regarding public influence on science, see STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: 
AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE PoLmcs OF KNOWLEDGE 26-41 (1996) (demonstrating the 
impact of AIDS activists on medical research and funding). 
61. See generally DAVID J. HEss, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A MULTICULTURAL 
WORLD: THE CULTURAL PoLmcs OF FACTS AND ARTIFACTS (1995); see also HARDING, 
supra note 35, at 2-3. 
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(1) Cognitive capacity and limitations, including perception62 
(2) Standards as to what is interesting or what is worth doing,63 
including 
(a) the effects of funding and patronage 
(b) general cultural values (for example, honesty) 
( c) specific ethical conceptions of, for example, unacceptable 
research 
(d) government policy and political interests (which overlap 
with (a), (b), and (c) above) 
(3) Language,64 including 
62. See RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS 48-53 (1999) (discussing "the 
biological and psychological mechanisms underlying the cognitive capacities of 
individual scientists," id. at 49, and the need to look to cognitive science to explore those 
mechanisms); see also Nancy J. Nersessian, Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Science 
and the History of Science, IO OSIRIS 194-211 (1995) (discussing cognitive history of 
science, cognitive science, and the investigation of creativity, conceptual innovations, 
technological innovations, communicative practices, and the role of training in science). 
63. See Kitcher, supra note 16, at 36 ("The social structures in which science is 
embedded affect the kinds of questions that are taken to be most significant and, 
sometimes, the answers that are proposed and accepted."). 
[T]he kinds of problems singled out as important depend in part on the history 
of the field and on the wider interests of members of society. . . . [S]ome 
problems are especially significant ... partly because of the history of research 
[in the field], partly because of what it is ... possible to do, and partly because 
of the practical consequences of certain forms of inquiry when applied to the 
problems of certain kinds of societies. 
Id. at 37; see also Pierre Bourdieu, The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social 
Conditions of the Progress of Reason, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER 31 (Mario 
Biagioli ed., 1999). 
[I]t is pointless to distinguish between strictly scientific determinations and 
strictly social determinations of practices that are essentially overdetennined . ... 
Fred Reif shows ... how artificial and indeed impossible it is to distinguish 
between intrinsic and extrinsic interest ... "A scientist strives to do research 
which he considers important. But intrinsic satisfaction and interest are not 
his only reasons . ... The scientist wants his work to be not only interesting to 
himself but also important to others." What is regarded as important and 
interesting is what is likely to be recognized by others as important and 
interesting .... 
Id. at 32-33 (quoting Fred Reif, The Competitive World of the Pure Scientist, 134 
SCIENCE 1957-62 (1961)). 
"The sciences depend upon their 'context' not only for funding and material resources; 
recruits and auxiliary personnel; institutional location in universities, academies, corporations, 
bureaucracies, or foundations; social norms, cultural forms, and bodily disciplines; but 
also for much of what is ultimately at issue or at stake in scientific practices." Joseph 
Rouse, Understanding Scientific Practices: Cultural Studies of Science as a 
Philosophical Program, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER, supra, at 442, 445. 
64. See Timothy Lenoir, Inscription Practices and Materialities of 
Communication, in INSCRIBING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC TEXTS AND THE MATERIALITY OF 
COMMUNICATION 1, 1-19 (Timothy Lenoir ed., 1998). 
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between scientific publications or concerns about Wittgensteinian language 
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(a) scientific and discursive regimes 
(b) governing metaphors 
(c) conventions of rhetoric and persuasion 
(4) Evolution and constraints of measurement instruments and 
technology65 
(5) Observation variables,66 including 
(a) dominant theoretical paradigms 
(b) models and maps that function as representations of nature 
( c) expectations, including their effect on interpretation of data 
(6) Institutional gatekeeping, including 
(a) training 
(b) professionalization 
games and fonns of life, have always been part of science studies in one form 
or another .... 
. . . [S]cholars from the side ofliterature studies have begun to focus on the 
role of rhetorical practice and techniques of persuasion in scientific texts, on 
narrative structures and metaphor in the internal structure of scientific work, 
and on the semiosis among scientific narratives and grand cultural narratives, 
represented in literature, museum exhibits, and popular culture, as means for 
the construction and stabilization of scientific artifacts. 
Id. at 1, 3; see also JOSEPH ROUSE, ENGAGING SCIENCE: How TO UNDERSTAND ITS PRACTICES 
PHILOSOPIDCAILY 158-65 (1996) (discussing the tum to narrative in science studies). 
65. See DAVID HEss, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD: 
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF FACTS AND ARTIFACTS 3 (1995) ("Even apparently 
transparent observations, such as machine inscriptions of data, are social because 
machine design is the product of a history that involves social negotiation, as are 
decisions over calibration and how to interpret machine inscriptions."). 
66. Id. 
What people expect to observe, are able to observe, and want to observe are all 
shaped in part by their theories and assumptions, which in tum are outcomes of 
discussions and controversies in which social negotiation is critical .... 
(However, ... this claim does not mean that observations have nothing to do 
with reality: observations are simultaneously socially shaped and 
representative of a "real" material or social world.) 
Id.; see also Donna J. Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER, 
supra note 63, at 172, 177. 
[A]II eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems, 
building in translations and specific ways of seeing . . . . There is no 
unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of 
bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each 
with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds. 
Haraway, supra at 177. 
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(c) symbolic capital67 (social networks, Rolodex, positions 
held, previous accomplishments, etc., that lend credibility) 
( d) consensus-building and negotiation techniques 
(7) Methodological variation and experimental conventions68 
The above catalogue, intended to capture ordinary social aspects of 
science as opposed to eliminable problems or negative influences, 
offers both a complex picture of science to supplement idealizations, 
which emphasize core aspects, and a categorization scheme for 
classifying statements made by scientists in my interviews. I did not 
classify references to core aspects of science, which were numerous, 
because I take it to be obvious that science involves theories, data 
collection, and conclusions that promise some level of objectivity, 
precision, and prediction. Again, my informants did not address each 
social category in our conversations; I began each interview with 
general questions about the informant's background and current 
research interests, and when I later asked about social aspects of their 
work I was intentionally ambiguous. In the following summaries of 
each interview, therefore, variable responses were to be expected.69 
67. See HESS, supra note 42, at 118. 
Some researchers have found Bourdieu's [concept] of symbolic capital ... to 
be particularly useful. One might think of symbolic capital as status viewed 
through a political economy lens. Symbolic capital can be saved and spent, 
hoarded and wasted, accumulated and invested, and transformed into financial 
capital. In terms of science, symbolic capital might be operationalized as a 
scientist's CV and rolodex, that is, a set of career achievements and a 
network . . . similar to the concepts of reputation and recognition in the 
sociology of science. 
Id.; see also Bourdieu, supra note 63, at 33. 
The struggle for scientific authority, a particular kind of social capital which 
gives power over the constitutive mechanisms of the field . . . owes its 
specificity to the fact that the producers tend to have no possible clients other 
than their competitors . . . . This means that in a highly autonomous scientific 
field, a particular producer cannot expect recognition of the value of his 
products ("reputation," "prestige," "authority," "competence," etc.) from 
anyone except other producers who, being his competitors too, are those least 
inclined to grant recognition without discussion and scrutiny. 
Bourdieu, supra note 63, at 33. 
68. See HESS, supra note 61, at 3. 
Id. 
Decisions on appropriate methods, criteria for establishing replication, 
statistical measures, quantitative versus qualitative measurement, and so on are 
shaped by rhetoric, network politics, disciplinary cultures, personal 
reputations, gender socialization patterns, and so on. There is no single 
Scientific Method to which all scientists can refer; instead, laboratory 
procedures are opportunistic and contingent on social factors. 
69. Interview with X, supra note 58; Interview with Y, supra note 59; Interview 
with Z, supra note 59. 
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(1) Cognitive Capacity and Limitations: "I also recognize the fact 
that my experience is different from many other humans . . . . 
Males tend to not think about odors in the same way as 
females." 
(2) Standards as to What Is Interesing and Important 
(a) Funding: "[I]t's important to have an income. In order to 
have an income you have to stay sort of within the 
mainstream of science." 
(3) Language: 
[Our] language is going to change how you think about [mind and body], 
and this happens in the law when it comes to the insanity defense; our 
ideas about human behavior are so inherently dualistic . . . I think 
changing the way people talk about this and reducing this dualistic 
language in terms of the descriptions of this physical world will actually 
be ... useful. ... 
(4) Instruments: 
It would be absurd to imagine that you didn't have constraints on the 
outcome you were expecting. By simply choosing a measurement 
instrument, a device to measure, you are generating hypotheses [that 
constrain] what's going to happen. We all know that you can measure one 
thing and have multiple things happening and then ignore those others. 
(5) Observation: 
I think one of the more interesting things in science are those people who 
are at the edge . . . and how they are either embraced or pushed out of 
regular scientific journals. . . . [Y]ou have a lot of expectations out 
there. . . . There are an infinite number of solutions so I have to constrain 
my solutions. 
(6) Institutional Gatekeeping: "[W]hen I asked my advisor if we 
couldn't do some smell experiments in the lab he said, no, we 
can't, it's just too difficult to control odors and stimulate and so 
we're not doing that." 
(1) Methodological Variation: 
[W]e lost evolutionary psychology. . . . It's actually impossible 
methodologically to compare a goldfish with a dog and people said of 
course and so it was dropped .... [T]hen suddenly in literally the last 5 
years, you have had this re-emergence of people who want to say things 
about the comparative nature of animals . . . . I think that ... we're re-




(1) Cognitive Capacity and Limitations: [no significant remarks] 
(2) Standards as to What Is Interesting and Important 
(a) Funding: 
[T]here were pharmaceutical firms that were very interested 
especially in following this .... [T]hen [the researchers in England 
with whom Y was working] approached a couple of big firms that 
are, I guess a number of pharmaceutical companies get together and 
they have a granting agency that ... support[s] this kind of research 
. . . . [T]he idea was there would [be] money to last for three years. 
Well, the money didn't go that far .... So they raised [money by 
going public]. 
(C) Ethical Policy Constraints: "[O]ur new administration 
put[s] such constraints on using fetal tissue for research .... 
That's an ethical issue that is so important . . . . [S]ocial 
values are getting in the way of scientific progress . . . in 
the [United] [S]tates .... " 
(3) Language: [Y agreed that there's an aspect of persuasiveness in 
science, convincing others that one's work is valuable to get 
funding.] 
(4) Instruments: [no significant remarks] 
(5) Observation 
(b) Models: 
You can create a stroke in rats by cutting off the carotid arteries and 
having them on a respirator for about ten minutes, but they lose 
about 60% of the animals, but they have the same kind of damage 
you have with a person who's had a heart attack... . So they 
[think] if [they] could directly damage those cells and not lose so 
many animals ... that would be a good kind of animal model .... 
( 6) Institutional Gatekeeping: "So we did one study that for the 
longest [time just] sat there and nobody paid any attention to it, 
and just within about the last two or three years, people really 
started paying attention." 
(7) Methodological Variation: [no significant remarks] 
INTERVIEW WITH Z: 
(1) Cognitive Capacity and Limitations: "I think it's not really 
practical or even advisable for a single person to try to cover all 
the bases [in every discipline]." 
(2) Standards as to What is Interesting and Important 
(a) Funding: 
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I think a lot of us whenever we make a pitch to the NIH ... have to 
indicate that there is some benefit [that] there is social good coming 
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out of what we do. . . . [W]hen you have a constituency to which 
you're accountable, you've got to show some meaningful progress 
.... And that is, I think, [an] apparent restriction of thought. 
(3) La,nguage: 
[O]ne of the first things that I tell students in a class [is that] because of 
the nature of the material, ... they're going to have to learn a lot of 
vocabulary.... [I]t's like learning words in the dictionary [to enhance] 
the ability to be conversant and to communicate in a succinct and accurate 
way .... 
(4) Instruments: [no significant remarks] 
(5) Observation 
(a) Paradigms: 
[T]here's a considerable amount of friction between [those] doing 
biological psychology, and people at other areas of the 
[psychology] department. Now the biological psychologists are in 
literally separated space . . . . [T]hose are people who have ... and 
I'll admit that I'm sort of one of them ... only a very peripheral 
interest in the overt behavior of the organisms that they study. 
(6) Institutional Gatekeeping: Funding requests are forwarded "to a 
group of peers who are expert, to evaluate your work for several 
different things. One is scientific novelty. Another one is rigor 
of the proposal-feasibility. . . . And they take into 
consideration things like your track record; your biographical 
sketch is an essential component." 
(1) Methodological Variation: [no significant remarks] 
The value of ethnography, or conversation analysis, is its 
informality-part anthropological interview with a key informant and 
part journalistic profile. The setting allows for unanticipated turns and 
linkages in a way that questionnaires sent to scientists might not.70 
Scientists' own accounts of their work are not likely to emphasize the 
institutional and rhetorical aspects of their work, except in the case of 
70. See Roger Smith & Brian Wynne, Introduction, in EXPERT EVIDENCE: 
INTERPRETING SCIENCE IN THE LAW 1 (Roger Smith & Brian Wynne eds., 1989) 
[hereinafter EXPERT EVIDENCE]. 
We all benefited from extensive discussions with practitioners in the science-
law area. Many of these discussions took the form of a relatively unstructured 
interview . . . . From the viewpoint of the empirical social sciences, our 
method is too informal to count as 'method'; but, given a deliberate orientation 
towards qualitative issues, it has served its purpose. 
Id. at 11. 
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autobiographies. Nevertheless, ethnography is obviously a supplement 
to, and not a replacement of, the sociology of science generally (which 
establishes the theory that science is a social activity), the philosophy of 
science, and the history of science, each of which includes critical 
scholars who offer insights as to how science really works in contrast to 
popular or idealized accounts of scientific progress, including idealized 
accounts within their own discipline. 
In the next section, I tum to the practical literature regarding the use of 
expert witnesses in trials, to show that the idealized version of scientific 
activity pervades that discourse among lawyers. My ultimate argument 
is that a discourse about science as a social enterprise would offer 
insights for lawyers to use in depositions, in Daubert-type hearings, 
during cross-examination, and in drafting jury instructions. 
III. SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE AND THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE 
"Of course social factors influence the course of science. The 
only controversy concerns which social factors are operative in 
which situations and how powerful these social factors tum out 
to be."71 
Expert scientific testimony is presented at trial in the context of a 
dispute. While the legal dispute is broader than and distinguishable from 
the scientific dispute, the disagreement between scientific experts 
becomes a matter for resolution by the judge or jury. Jeremy Green 
identifies three models of scientific disputes-contextual, ethnosociological, 
and epistemological explanations-that emphasize "different aspects of 
the scientific process.',n Contextual explanations "might refer to 
differences in disciplinary perspectives, institutional or occupational 
affiliations, methodological and metaphysical commitments, or social 
interests."73 In his study of English workers' compensation cases, Green 
found contextual explanations "comparatively rare."74 Ethnosociological 
explanations, which might "refer to factors extraneous to the scientific 
content of the dispute-for example, to the competence, neutrality and 
openness, or the honesty of the participants" were slightly more 
common.75 
71. Hull, supra note 15, at 74. 
12. See Jeremy Green, Industrial Ill Health, Expertise, and the Law, in EXPERT 
EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 93, 119. 
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Most common of all were epistemological explanations; expert witnesses and 
barristers (the latter overwhelmingly so) preferred to explain disputes as caused 
by the absence of sufficient facts or by 'grey areas.' Disagreement was seen as 
a result of differences in interpretation, not differences as to what were the facts . 
. . . [S]ociologial critiques of expertise were regularly translated ... into personal 
accusations of bias .... Both the preferred explanation-shortage of facts and 
legitimate differences in interpretation, and the rejected one-bias, are cast in 
individualistic terms. The contextual dimension, and accounts of commitments 
that do not entail personal bias, are excluded.76 
The same tendency to exclude contextual explanations is evident in 
the discourse concerning scientific expertise among U.S. lawyers. For 
example, in Impeachment of Witnesses: The Cross-Examiner's Art, the 
chapter on impeaching expert witnesses emphasizes pretrial discovery, 
especially depositions, of adverse expert witnesses, as well as identifying 
publications and transcripts of previous testimony, as important to 
preparation.77 In addition to questioning the qualifications of an expert 
and the consistency of the opinion with authoritative treatises,78 impeachment 
can be based on "interest, bias, and motivation," that is, by showing that the 
expert is not "a disinterested professional."79 While payment for 
testimony alone is not determinative, the fact that an expert derives a 
substantial portion of her income from testifying, that the expert always 
testifies for the same "side," that the expert opinion was prepared for 
trial and was not basetl on information and knowledge acquired as part 
of the expert's regular activities, or that professional conflict and 
jealousy may be present, can each provide a basis for impeachment. 80 
By reference to Green's models of scientific disputes,81 the authors of 
Impeachment of Witnesses seem to view scientific disputes as 
epistemological (involving shortage of facts, differences in interpretation)82 
and ethnosociological (involving competence, neutrality),83 and they 
76. Id. at 120. 
77. See ROBERTO ARON ET AL., IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: THE CROSS-
EXAMINER'S ART 140-47 (1990). 
78. Id. at 147-51, 160-65. 
19. Id. at 151. 
80. Id. at 151-55. 
81. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
82. See ARON ET AL., supra note 77, at 158 (providing an example of a doctor who 
did not personally observe the deceased but relied on observations of a forensic 
pathologist without a lot of experience); id. at 154 (providing an example of a doctor 
with a new theory that is subject to substantial academic and scientific criticism). 
83. See id. at 147-51 (discussing how to question qualifications); id. at 151-55 
(discussing how to establish interest, bias, and motivation to show that the expert is not a 
"disinterested professional"). 
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tend to cast bias, interest and motivation in individualistic terms. 
Contextual explanations are thereby eclipsed, and the fields of "disciplinary 
perspectives, institutional or occupational affiliations, methodological 
and metaphysical commitments, or social interests" are not mentioned as 
rich sources for impeachment materials, except as to personal qualifications 
and accusations of individual bias.84 
In Malone and Zwier's Effective Expert Testimony, discussing cross-
examination on financial or other bias, the same individualistic emphasis 
is apparent; financial or other bias are matters for impeachment. 85 Later 
in their treatise, the authors distinguish impeachment from "substantive" 
cross-examination,86 and the treatise concludes with a chapter on 
examining reliability using the four Daubert factors (testability, error 
rate, publication, and general acceptance) and others (for example, 
science prepared for litigation, adequacy to explain important empirical 
data, basis in sufficient data, consistency, credentials, and derivation 
from mainstream approaches).87 That is, when the authors consider 
more contextual matters involving the scientific community and not 
personal bias, the framework for examination reflects an idealized view 
of science nearly bereft of, in Green's formulation, the field of "disciplinary 
perspectives, institutional or occupational affiliations, methodological 
and metaphysical commitments, or social interests."88 Indeed, earlier in 
their treatise, Malone and Zwier caution against "macro" lines of cross-
examination that go "after the whole discipline": The "place to challenge 
an entire field is in limine, in a Daubert-type challenge."89 Malone and 
Zwier have also developed a useful set of rules for deposing expert 
witnesses, including a recommendation that counsel ask what the expert 
relied on or decided not to rely on, who in the expert's field agrees or 
disagrees with the expert, and who did the collection of data (for 
84. Green, supra note 72, at 119. Roberto Aron et al. discuss cross-examining a 
witness who holds a novel theory that is out of step with mainstream science, but only to 
raise professional conflict and jealousy as a persuasive basis for impeachment. ARON ET 
AL., supra note 77, at 154. They also discuss lack of professional affiliations as a basis 
for questioning qualifications. See id. at 18-21. 
85. DAVID M. MALONE & PAUL J. ZWIER, EFFECTIVE EXPERT TEsTIMONY 164 
(2000). 
86. Id. at 187. Substantive cross-examination, in contrast to impeaching inquires, 
involves factual issues in the case-why a bracket failed or whether tests were 
conducted. 
87. See id. at 223-33. 
88. Green, supra note 72, at 119. In fairness, the reliability inquiry could 
potentially lead to evidence regarding disciplinary perspectives (for example, explaining 
why a novel theory has not been published), but institutional affiliations, methodological 
commitments, or social interests (for example, funding for certain kinds of research but 
not others, due to corporate, government, or public influence) do not appear in legal 
discourse as factors relevant to reliability. 
89. MALONE & ZWIER, supra note 85, at 193. 
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example, assistants),90 each of which could lead to a more contextual 
approach, but tend not to because of the pervasive emphasis on a 
particular, individual expert and not the community or discipline.91 
Professor Edward Imwinkelried' s The Methods of Attacking Scientific 
Evidence identifies the potential of bias (i) in favor of a particular 
instrument or technique in which an expert has a financial interest,92 (ii) 
originating in prior knowledge and opinions,93 (iii) due to prior 
occupation (for example, law enforcement),94 (iv) in favor of a particular 
party or type of party (for example, large corporations, or injured 
plaintiffs),95 (v) related to indirect financial interests (for example, 
affiliation with an organization or university that "receive[s] grants 
from a party to the lawsuit or from the same industry"),96 or (vi) in 
favor of a particular theory or technique, which Imwinkelried calls 
"doctrinal bias."97 While lmwinkelried frames these types of bias in the 
individualistic terms typical of legal discourse concerning impeachment, 
the contours of a contextual or communal notion of bias begin to emerge. 
Green's field of "disciplinary perspectives, institutional or occupational 
affiliations, methodological and metaphysical commitments, or social 
interests"98 need not be translated, as usual,99 into personal accusations 
of bias-lmwinkelreid even refers to prior knowledge, opinion, and 
occupations as "innocent" or "subconscious" bias that lacks the bad faith 
associated with crass financial interests. 100 Instead of characterizing bias 
as the opposite of good science, disciplinary, institutional, occupational, 
or methodological bias can be seen as part of science. As to the former 
90. See DAVID M. MALoNE & PAUL J. ZWIER, EXPERT RULES: 100 (AND MORE) 
POINTS You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT EXPERT WITNESSES 49-53 (2d ed. 2001). 
91. Again, in fairness, the question: "Who in this field agrees with your 
methodology?," id. at 52, seems to implicate a discipline or scientific community, but the 
only point is that a particular expert may be an "outlier," id., in conflict with other 
experts. The idea that scientific communities-their language, values, consensus-
building techniques, and institutions-represent a force, alongside nature in the 
production of knowledge, is not suggested. 
92. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
118 (3d ed. 1997). 
93. Id. at 250. 
94. Id. at 252. 
95. Id. at 255. 
96. Id. at 256. 
97. Id. at 257. 
98. See Green, supra note 72, at 119. 
99. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
100. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 92, at 252. 
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characterization-bias is bad---consider F. Lee Bailey and Henry B. 
Rothblatt's Cross-Examination in Criminal Trials: "The good forensic 
pathologist is detached and objective. However, you will encounter 
some pathologists who will not be quite so professional. ... You must 
be aware at the signs indicating that a medical examiner is 
biased .... " 101 
Contrast that warning with Dr. Bernard Diamond's view that "all 
witnesses, regardless of who engaged them, identify closely with their 
own opinions and unintentionally introduce as a result a certain degree 
of bias and deviation from their oath to tell the truth .... "102 Experts are 
"bound to be biased and partial and strongly motivated toward advocacy 
of [a] particular prejudiced point of view." 103 Inevitable bias in science 
is more readily acknowledged among social scientists as "human beings 
with social identities, beliefs, and values that link them to some causes 
and parties more than to others."104 However, the notions that social 
science "depends upon, benefits from, and is interdependent with 
extrascientific institutions," and that "financial allocations have overt or 
covert strings attached [that] shape what gets studied [and] perhaps what 
is concluded,"105 are arguably applicable to the hard sciences. For 
example, 
it is not possible to pursue either a programme of research or a career in 
[complex areas of medicine] in isolation from a limited set of key institutions; 
and the high financial costs of maintaining these institutions have led 
researchers towards an increasingly close relationship with those industries that 
have a direct interest in the extent and content of knowledge about particular 
kinds of ill health. 106 
Nevertheless, such "social" analyses of expertise seem rare in the 
treatises on cross-examination of expert witnesses. 
Roger Smith and Brian Wynne have attempted to explain the lack of 
attention to contextual--disciplinary, institutional, occupational, and 
methodological-models of scientific disputes in law. 107 They identify a 
persistent "hope that the objectivity of science will provide a firm and 
authoritative input, giving decisions a factual basis that cannot be 
questioned. That the science often appears equivocal is put down to 
101. F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATI, CROSS-EXAMINATION IN CRIMINAL 
TRIALS241 (1978). 
102. Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, in READINGS IN LAW 
AND PSYCHIATRY 217, 218-19 (Richard C. Allen et al. eds., 1975). 
103. Id. at 221. 
104. See MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING 
EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 63 (1988). 
105. See id. at 63-64. 
106. Green, supra note 72, at 126. 
107. See generally Smith & Wynne, supra note 70. 
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procedural problems rather than inherent properties of scientific 
knowledge or methods .... " 108 
Legal institutions function under pressures, "under constraints of time 
and finite resources," that narrow the agenda in challenges of expertise.109 
Conditions of pressure therefore have the consequence that legal or expert 
practitioners tend to perceive and think about the science-law relation at the 
level of detail . . . . There may be difficulties of interpretation, agreement, 
efficiency, and such like, at this level, but ... [t]o accept that there may be more 
basic or general problems would be to accept potential problems in the 
construction of authority by the institutions of science and law themselves .... 
It is therefore hardly surprising that what literature there is on scientific 
expertise in the law is mostly concerned with detailed and specific matters about 
knowledge or procedure .... 110 
Insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge, for example, "that 
even the most disciplined and objective observation is never free of 
theoretical and thus interpretive precommitmenfs,"111 or that a "proven 
fact is ultimately a social achievement among scientists,"112 do not pass 
easily into law as general propositions. The laws of evidence have 
already constituted "certain kinds of knowledge as expert,"113 and even 
though particular scientists are fair game for challenge, the "metaphysics 
of law is that ... 'science' is reliable."114 On the other hand, "legal 
procedures often actually generate sceptical pressures on scientific 
expertise. Indeed, such procedures sometimes show that 'established 
scientific fact' is riddled with suppositions, unstated limiting conditions, 
and other qualifications or uncertainties."115 That is, lawyers regularly 
"deconstruct" scientific claims116-the "formal legal process can be 
108. Id. at 1. 
109. Id. at 3. 
110. Id. at4-5. 
111. See Brian Wynne, Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert 
Authority, in EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 23, 23. 
112. Id. at 28. 
113. See id. at 32. 
114. See id. at 54. 
115. Id. at 32. 
116. Id. 
[Legal] procedures sometimes show that 'established scientific fact' is riddled 
with suppositions, unstated limiting conditions, and other qualifications or 
uncertainties. 
For instance, if one side in a case advances an expert claim stripped of 
those nuances, the other side, if competent, may then proceed to reintroduce 
them .... This 'deconstructs' the other side's scientific claim, showing it to 
be made up of empirically unwarranted 'collective opinion.' 
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described as institutionalized pure mistrust."117 Nevertheless, the usual 
limits of cross-examination, as well as any imbalance of resources among 
parties, "restrict the free play of scepticism."118 Most important, legal 
institutions refer "to natural scientific authority in constructing [their] own 
social authority,"119 and through judicial decision making, "the private 
intellectual bloodbath of . . . court exchanges may be translated into a 
more orderly account for public consumption."120 Scientific knowledge, 
that is, is "open to deconstruction and reconstruction."121 Finally, to the 
extent that there is a tension between the view that scientific knowledge or 
method is superior to and capable of settling the arguments of interested 
legal parties or advocates, on the one hand, and the view that scientific 
"knowledge" is "capable of being manipulated to reflect and support any 
interests which have the resources to 'buy' expertise,"122 lawyers and 
judges seem to hold the former view. "Bought" or "manipulated" 
knowledge is not science, and ideally is to be eliminated prior to its 
introduction (in a Daubert-type hearing) or discredited during cross-
examination. 
The purpose of this Article is to identify a field of inquiry between the 
extremes of an idealized view of science, in which social aspects (such as 
institutional gatekeeping, professionalization, consensus-building 
techniques, and discursive regimes) are considered irrelevant, and the 
conception that social factors (like funding, prior occupation, theoretical 
commitment, and organizational affiliations) signal individual bias and not 
expertise. The former view emphasizes core aspects of science such as 
theory, data, test, conclusion, and publication and acceptance, while 
eclipsing any substantial inquiry into the social aspects of science; the 
latter emphasizes arguably social aspects of science but only as errors to 
be eliminated. Neither view leads to a complex picture of the scientific 
enterprise as a social, rhetorical, and institutional practice. 
Consider again my catalogue of social aspects of science, as they are 
presented in Diagram III to contrast with and replace Diagram II, which 
downplayed social factors as eliminable or as merely background features. 
Id. While sociologists of science accept that "scientific conflicts offer the most fruitful 
examination of scientific knowledge in-the-making, because the adversarial pressure 
forces the premises and conventions of each side out into the open," legal "contexts 
could be described as a special case of this general type." Id. at 33. 
117. Id. "Legal processes enshrine scepticism and mistrust: cross-examination has 
a duty to question as fully as possible the adversary's case in front of the judge or jury." 
Id. at 37. 
118. See id. at 36. 
119. See id. at 37. 
120. See id. at 38. "Reconstruction from the ensuing intellectual debris is not the 
expert's, but the judge's responsibility." Id. at 37. 
121. See id. at 49. 
122. See id. at 53. 
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Under an idealized view of science that concedes the presence of the 
aspects in Diagram III, but considers them usually irrelevant or even 
admirable, and under the complimentary view that social aspects 
otherwise signal eliminable bias, the features depicted are not likely to 
be seen as important to legal evaluations of scientific claims. My 
argument is that they are important because they are typical structures in 
science, and could in particular cases be useful avenues of inquiry in 
pretrial depositions or in cross-examination, and also provide useful 
insights in drafting jury instructions. Significantly, I am not suggesting 
that the presence of such aspects is especially, in particular cases, good 
or bad. One can argue that the gatekeeping mechanisms of science are 
good for scientific progress, and an attorney whose expert witness has 
been attacked for belonging to a narrow school of thought could use 
such an argument to reconstruct integrity. 
On the other hand, institutional gatekeeping might signal impeachable 
bias against novel but unpublished research. Inevitable aspects of 
science, like language, instrumentation, theoretical commitments, and 
funding sources are best approached neutrally, as though they may or 
may not be significant, and as though they may be positive or negative 
features, in a particular case. Consequently, an inquiry along these lines 
might be as reconstructive as it is deconstructive. In any event, scientific 
expertise will be presented as it really is, neither idealized nor as subject 
to crass manipulation. Social aspects are neither uniformly wonderful 
nor instances of eliminable bias-they are present, for good or bad, in 
particular cases involving scientific claims. 
David Malone and Paul Zwier, in Expert Rules: 100 (and More) 
Points You Need to Know About Expert Witnesses, suggest attorneys 
deposing expert witnesses always ask about opinions formed, what was 
done to reach them, how it was done, why it was done, what 
assumptions were made, whether there are reliable authorities in the 
field, and what tasks were not done; other recommended questions 
include what did the expert review and decide not to rely on, who in the 
field agrees or disagrees with the expert, the Daubert questions (peer 
review and publication, error rate, general acceptance, and testability and 
replicability), who selected the materials reviewed, and who are the 
assistants who collected data. 123 This approach, despite its typical 
idealization of science and emphasis on individual bias (science is good; 
it is scientists that are bad), begins to touch on some elements of 
socialinquiry: (1) asking what the expert decided not to do, or not to rely 
on, refers both to conventions in the field and to standards as to what is 
123. See MALONE & ZWIER, supra note 90, at 49-56. 
300 
[VOL. 39: 269, 2002] Idealized Accounts of Science 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
worth looking into; (2) asking who selected the data to review (for 
example, counsel), and about the assistants who collected data, refers to 
the effect of expectation on experimental conventions, and to 
professionalization, respectively. One could just as easily ask about 
institutional funding for this type of research, policy or ethical constraints, 
dominant models or theories, and limitations of measurement technology, 
but a more informal line of questions similar to those used in 
ethnomethodology (or conversation analysis) might reveal more about 
the presence of such aspects. That is, asking experts to describe 
generally what they do, who funds their work, where such work is done, 
other scientists with whom they work or communicate regularly, what 
gets in the way of progress in the field, and even failed experiments or 
theories, will produce a transcript for analysis of social aspects. Again, 
these conversational answers will not likely reveal intentional bias, but 
innocent or inevitable bias, including cognitive or technological 
limitations. Both at a Daubert-type hearing before trial, which permits 
inquiry beyond "the four factors" (since the Daubert test is flexible and 
not written in stone), 124 and at trial during cross-examination, the goal is 
not only to dismiss or impeach experts, but also to understand the limits of 
and constraints upon the methodology and results offered. Cross-
examination along these lines begins to look like sociological skepticism 
of scientific certainty-claims that are presented as natural or obvious 
are seen as the product of consensus-building techniques, gap-filling 
assumptions, experimental conventions and tentative models of nature.125 
Id. 
124. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note. 
Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in 
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony .... 
No attempt has been made to "codify" these specific factors. Daubert 
itself emphasized that the factors were neither exclusive nor dispositive .... 
Courts both before and after Daubert have found other factors relevant in 
determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable .... 
125. See Wynne, supra note 111, at 33-34. 
[S]tudies of scientific controversies have shown how scientific knowledge 
taken as natural and universal by one school may be exposed as a tissue of 
selective observations based upon a limited set of localized technical practices 
and theoretical resources, and accepted inference bridges across gaps in 
evidence, while partly leaning for credibility upon commitments to adjacent 
bodies of knowledge which are similarly constructed. The whole edifice is a 
network of combined social-cognitive commitments.... [Sceptics] can cut 
away the apparently 'natural' warrants in these inference bridges and network 
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As to jury instructions, Charles Kester has proposed that juries be 
instructed to consider that all science is socially constructed and relies 
upon dominant theoretical paradigms, unproven assumptions, and 
communal interaction. 126 While Kester' s proposal relies on his own 
questionable assumption that scientists understand and concede the 
social construction of reality, 127 his proposal would make more sense if 
juries actually had some evidence of exactly how science works as a 
social enterprise. If experts were deposed or cross-examined on the 
cognitive and instrumental limitations on their interpretations, the effects 
of funding and cultural values on their work, the networks of persuasion 
in which they work, the dominant theories and models to which they 
ascribe, and the gatekeeping mechanisms of science, an instruction to 
consider those matters in their deliberation would be meaningful. 
N. SELF-CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSION 
Because I have couched my otherwise theoretical, interdisciplinary 
argument in practical terms, I anticipate the concern of practitioners that 
careful attention to the social aspects of the scientific enterprise would 
further complicate an already complex field of inquiry. Given the 
numerous and lengthy volumes on how to conduct cross-examination of 
expert witnesses, it is hard to imagine the subject could be further 
complicated. Nevertheless, considering the social aspects of science can 
be seen only as an expansion of the flexible Daubert inquiry, the various 
bases for impeachment, and the suggested lines of questioning for cross-
examination. On the other hand, the social studies of science on which I 
have relied have as their goal a more accurate account of the way 
scientists actually work and of the way scientific knowledge is produced. 
I think it is more accurate, that is, than either (i) the idealized view of 
science as exclusively anchored in nature (rather than, alongside nature, in 
language, rhetoric, interpretation, values, social interests, and institutions) 
or (ii) the deflationary view of scientists as variously greedy, for sale, or 
crutches, showing the subtle social, conventional character of the knowledge. 
Id. 
126. See Kester, supra note 19, at 545-46. Kester proposes that juries be instructed, 
in part, as follows: "Although this [qualified witness's] expertise provides the [witness] 
with specialized knowledge, it may also have the effect of giving the [witness] a vested 
interest in publishing certain papers, or in seeing a certain outcome, or in maintaining 
[the witness's] status. . . . [T]he opinion stated ... was based on certain assumptions." 
Id. at 565-66. 
127. Kester claims that "realist accounts of verification and falsificationism have 
largely been rejected," id. at 567, but I remain suspicious. I instead agree with Callebaut, 
supra note 38, at xvi, that a "majority of philosophers . . . defend some variety of 
realism," and that a naturalist tum is evident among historians, philosophers and 
sociologists of science. 
302 
[VOL. 39: 269, 2002] Idealized Accounts of Science 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
precommitted to their corporate employer, their funding source, or their 
favorite theory. The Daubert opinion itself, 128 though not revolutionary, 
succeeded in establishing a new regime for evaluation of expert scientific 
testimony, reflected in the new Federal Rule of Evidence 702, that is more 
complex than the Frye regime, 129 all of which is justifiable on the basis 
that scientific reliability is a more complex matter than "general 
acceptance." And while the Daubert four-part test is not sufficiently 
attentive to the social aspects of science, the flexible approach that 
accompanies most references to the Daubert hearing anticipates new 
factors that will become part of Daubert-type analyses. 130 Even without 
attention to the social aspects of science, the test for reliability becomes 
more complicated as new situations confront federal courts. 
A related concern might be the effect of inquires into social aspects on 
trial judges, who, despite the promise that they are given "considerable 
leeway" as to how to conduct Daubert hearings, and when to allow or 
disallow a particular expert's testimony, 131 are regularly reversed for 
being too lenient in admitting questionable testimony, 132 or for being too 
restrictive in disallowing potentially useful testimony. 133 Sometimes a 
judge thinks a sufficient Daubert hearing was held, but an appellate 
panel does not see enough careful and meticulous attention.134 
Sometimes the Daubert hearing is misused or misunderstood in the eyes 
of an appellate panel.135 Given that it is an abuse of discretion to rely on 
128. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
129. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that 
expert opinion is admissible if based on principle or discovery sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the field to which it belongs). 
130. See discussion, supra note 125. 
131. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) ("[T]he trial 
judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about 
determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable."). 
132. See, e.g., Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 744-50 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the trial judge misapprehended the gatekeeping requirement of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 by admitting testimony of an expert based on an untested, novel 
method; the case was remanded for a Daubert hearing). 
133. See, e.g., Jahn v. Equine Services, PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that the trial judge "employed a standard of admissibility more stringent than 
that expressed Federal Rule of Evidence 702"). 
134. See, e.g., U.S. v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306,314,324 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert on eyewitness identification 
without first conducting a Daubert hearing; the dissent argued that the trial judge 
conducted its Daubert analysis properly). 
135. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that the trial "court erred by relying on a single, potentially irrelevant, criterion to 
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a "forbidden factor" in Daubert-type analyses, 136 what is the status of an 
inquiry into the social aspects of science? 
Questions about the effects of funding, persuasion, evolving instruments, 
observational variables, and institutional gatekeeping would fit into both 
the flexible Daubert hearing and into conventional cross-examination 
techniques, but they are not a substitute for questions about core 
elements of science-hypothesis, data and methodology-or concerns 
about intentional bias on the part of a particular scientist. My point is 
that in some cases, evidence of social aspects might be useful to 
consider, for negative or positive assessments of the reliability of 
particular testimony. Judges should welcome such useful, mediating 
insights, but I concede that these are not the usual factors. 
The greatest concern is one that has been identified in social studies of 
science that engage in "epistemologically symmetrical" analyses. That 
is, the social aspects of science have been used in traditional analyses to 
explain errors or unscientific knowledge; 137 as scientific controversies 
arise, one side is correct because it accurately describes nature, and the 
other side's mistake is explained, for example, by funding bias, political 
pressure, a corporate agenda, a faulty theoretical paradigm, or poor 
training. Relativistic social scientists, in contrast, do not assume that one 
side is correct, or on the side of nature. Rather, their epistemologically 
symmetrical analyses assume that social aspects are at work in both 
sides of a controversy. 138 However, 
an epistemologically symmetrical analysis of a controversy is almost 
always more useful to the side with less scientific credibility .... The side 
with fewer scientifically or socially credentialed resources is more likely to 
attempt to enroll the [neutral] researcher, whereas the better-credentialed 
side views an epistemologically symmetrical analysis as threatening to its 
cognitive and social authority, and it is more likely to react to the analyst with 
hostility or suspicion. 139 
In legal-scientific disputes, the risk of introducing the social aspects of 
science (in depositions, Daubert hearings, cross-examination, or jury 
instructions) is that they will become challenges to mainstream science. 
In this Article, I have taken a modified "symmetrical" position that social 
determine that plaintiffs proposed experts based their conclusions on methodologies that 
are not sufficiently reliable to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 
702"). 
136. See Powell v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 938 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the coun abuses discretion when relying "on a forbidden factor or failure to 
consider an essential factor"). 
137. See Pam Scott et al., Captives of Controversy: The Myth of the Neutral Social 
Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies, 15 Sci., TECHNOLOGY, & HUM. 
VALUES 474, 474-75 (1990). 
138. See id. at 475. 
139. Id. at 490. 
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aspects of science are not signals of eliminable bias, but that they are 
inevitable aspects of the scientific enterprise, for good or bad. Social 
aspects, like institutional gatekeeping or dominant theoretical paradigms, 
can be shown to be positive supports for useful knowledge. They can also 
be shown to be constraints on scientific progress. My conclusion is 
neither that social aspects are always useful to novel scientific proposals, 
nor that they are always useful to mainstream science. My conclusion is 
that they are present, and that any inquiry into the reliability of a particular 
expert opinion should include, alongside the core aspects of idealized 
accounts of science and alongside the conventional notion of bias, a 
careful consideration of the social aspects of the scientific enterprise. 
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